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STRUCTURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMI-
NAL ENFORCEMENT 
Michael Herz* 
INTRODUCTION 
A single question dominates the much discussed recent growth of 
J-\criminal enforcement of environmental laws: Is criminal envi-
ronmental law a species of environmental law or a species of crimi-
nal law? These are distinct and generally self-contained bodies of 
law - each has its own set of statutes, its own division in the 
Justice Department, and its own course in law school. Although 
most areas of law, from bankruptcy through corporations to tax, 
have "integrated" environmental law with reasonable success, the 
criminal law has not. 1 
One might also observe that the criminal law has integrated other 
regulatory schemes more successfully than it has environmental 
law. Criminal enforcement of antitrust, securities, or tax laws gener-
ates far less controversy and dismay than does criminal enforce-
ment of environmental laws. 
As an historical matter, environmental criminal enforcement has 
developed more as a type of environmental law rather than as a 
type of criminal law. In general, prosecutors have not turned to 
environmental violations as additional crimes; rather, environmental 
enforcers have turned to criminal prosecutions for additional en-
forcement. Likewise, the criminal enforcement regime was added to 
supplement an existing civil enforcement regime, and criminal 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Univer-
sity. Thanks to Richard Lazarus for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Parts of 
this paper draw on a larger project concerning DOJ control of government litiga-
tion on which I am working with Neal Devins of the William and Mary Law 
School. 
1. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution 
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. LJ. 
2407, 2417-19 (1995). 
679 
680 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII 
enforcement is seen as a harsher substitute for civil enforcement. 2 
Viewing the problem from the perspective of environmental en-
forcement, criminal sanctions are just one more, unfortunately 
underutilized, arrow in the enforcement quiver. But for many this 
attitude - and the failure to see criminal enforcement as essentially 
different from other enforcement tools - leads to inappropriate 
prosecutions. 
This Article discusses structural protections against prosecutorial 
overreaching. It particularly focuses on the allocation of lawyering 
tasks, namely investigative and prosecutorial responsibility, among 
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Main Justice, and 
the U.S. Attorneys Offices ("USAOs"). The division of labor be-
tween Main Justice and the USAO has been a source of enormous 
debate, notably through oversight investigations and hearings held 
by Representative John Dingell.3 This Article examines this divi-
sion, but concentrates on the role of EPA lawyers in criminal prose-
cutions. In particular, it asks whether EPA should handle criminal 
prosecutions, without the involvement of the Department of Justice 
("DOJ"). This Article concludes that it should not, because shared 
control is an important structural protection against prosecutorial 
overreaching which is accompanied by few costs. 
2. See generally Daniel Riesel & Arthur Jacobson, The Criminalization of 
Environmental Law, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 1992, at 28. 
3. For contrasting views of the performance of OOJ's Environmental Crimes 
Section ("ECS") and the appropriate amount of centralization of environmental 
prosecutions, compare STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTI-
GATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, DAMAGING DISAR-
RAY: ORGANIZATIONAL BREAKDOWN AND REFORM IN THE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT'S ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., 
(1994) [hereinafter DAMAGING DISARRAY] with William T. Hassler, Congressio-
nal Oversight of Federal Environmental Prosecutions: The Trashing of Environ-
mental Crimes, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074 (Feb. 1994). The three-
year controversy over the ECS and centralization of environmental prosecutions 
was brought to a close by: ( 1) the April 1994 resignation of ECS chief Neil 
Cartusciello, (2) an August 23, 1994 amendment to the U.S. Attorney's Manual 
devolving prosecutorial decision-making back to the USAOs, and (3) the Novem-
ber 1994 elections. The struggle is ably detailed in Theodora Galacatos, Note, 
The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case 
Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight and the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (1995). 
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I. MINIMIZING THREATS OF PR0SECUT0RIAL OVERREACHING 
Federal environmental statutes provide for criminal sanctions. 4 
Persons who "knowingly" violate certain provisions can be fined, 
imprisoned, or both. 5 As the following table indicates, the last de-
cade and a half has seen a striking increase in the number of crimi-
nal prosecutions.6 
EPA EPA EPA Indict- Convic- Sent 
Agents Cases lnit. Referrals ments tions -ences* Fines** 
1982 20 14 11 0 
1985 40 37 5.4 .57 
1988 59 50 15.4 
1990 51 112 56 100 75.3 5.5 
1991 62 150 81 104 80.3 14.1 
1992 72 203 107 150 94.6 37.9 
1993 110 410 140 161 74.3 29.7 
1994 123 525 220 250 99.0 36.8 
* Years of incarceration 
** Millions of dollars 
This rise in prosecution has been accompanied by growing concern 
over prosecutorial overreaching. 
4. The focus in this Article is exclusively on federal environmental enforce-
ment. The general themes and concerns are identical at the state level, but many 
of the specifics vary. 
5. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
§ 3008(d) (1994) ("RCRA"); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), Clean Water Act § 309(c) 
(1994) ("CWA"); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b), Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act § 103(b) (1994) ("CERCLA"); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(c), Clean Air Act § 113(c) (1994) ("CAA"). The provisions for civil lia-
bility do not require any particular state of mind. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), 
CAA§ 113(b) (1994). 
6. Hard, consistent numbers are hard to come by, and the figures here are 
somewhat inconsistent with what can be found in other source~. This table is 
drawn from the following sources: David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Mo-
rality, and the Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 146 n.6 (1995); U.S. OOJ NEWS RELEASE, Depart-
ment of Justice Gets Tough on Environmental Criminals, at 4 (Dec. 27, 1989); 
U.S. EPA, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS RE-
PORT, FY 1994, at 4-3, Figure 4-2 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT 
REPORT]. 
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A. Risks of Prosecutorial Excess 
The marriage of criminal and environmental law presents three 
problems. First, it is a common and reasonably well-founded com-
plaint that whether a case is brought as a civil , 1:· ·:riminal action 
depends largely on happenstance and which investigator happens to 
get the file in the first place.7 Indeed, one former prosecutor has 
likened environmental prosecutions to criminal adultery prosecu-
tions. They "have at least three things in common. Enforcement is 
selective and erratic and the consequences are often harsh."8 The 
two other problems must be stated in the alternative: (1) there are 
too many criminal prosecutions,9 and (2) there are too few. 10 
7. See, e.g., 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 8.01[9), at 8-117 
(Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1995); Kevin Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, 
Frontier Justice, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 23, 24 ("whether a violation is 
treated criminally, civilly, or administratively is more a function of what type of 
investigator first learns of the infraction and in which judicial district it occurs, 
rather than its environmental severity"); Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at 
Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the 
Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 913 (1991) (noting that "the 
way a case is handled depends on whose desk the case first arrives"). 
8. Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental 
Wrongs, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,065, 10,065 (Mar. 1985). 
9. In the words of one former Environment Division official: 
Our system for punishing criminal environmental offenses is supposed 
to send a deterrent message: If you do something seriously wrong, the 
government will impose appropriately severe penalties . .. . [Howev-
er,) the deterrent message has been garbled. In a few cases, defiantly 
bad actors have skated free or had their wrists slapped; in too many 
others, prosecutors have gone scorched-earth over comparatively trivi-
al and unintended misconduct .... Obviously, almost everyone tries 
to avoid violations of the environmental laws - at least the business-
es I've worked with. But just as obviously, violations of one sort or 
another occur from time to time at most major facilities. When laws 
are complex and subject to varying interpretation, well-intentioned 
people can make mistakes. 
Donald A. Carr, Prosecutors Out of Control, ECO, June 1993, at 56. See Mi-
chael B. Gerrard, Who Goes to Jail? Understanding Criminal Liability for 
Wastewater Violations, CLEARWATERS, Winter 1996, at 8. 
10. See, e.g., DAMAGING DISARRAY, supra note 3; Marianne Lavelle & Mar-
cia Copley, Hill to Examine Environmental Prosecutions, NAT'L L.J. June 28, 
1993, at 5. 
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Without choosing between these two (but noting in passing that if 
these are the objections, the program may be doing exactly what it 
should be), this Article focuses on the first concern. The underlying 
issues here have been well-expressed by many writers, most recent-
ly and thoroughly by Richard Lazarus from the academic's perspec-
tive11 and Judson Starr from the practitioner's.12 We assume, for 
good reason, that criminal prosecutions have firm moral and legal 
underpinnings. Conduct meriting criminal prosecution is plainly 
illegal, morally wrong, seriously harmful, and pursued with a culpa-
ble state of mind. Yet environmental law is notoriously and increas-
ingly complex, ambiguous, and aspirational, and it prohibits a great 
deal of conduct that only poses a risk of harm or causes no harm in 
itself but becomes harmful only if combined with a myriad of other 
similar actions. Therefore, environmental criminal prosecutions pose 
a particular risk of inconsistency with the normative foundations of 
the criminal law.13 
The danger of inappropriate criminal prosecution that arises from 
the nature of the environmental regulatory regime is exacerbated by 
11. See Lazarus, supra note 1; Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental 
Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 867 (1994). For an especially strong statement of the inappropriate-
ness of criminal environmental prosecutions across the board, see Spence, supra 
note 6, at 172-81 (arguing that criminal sanctions for environmental violations are 
not only completely unnecessary but also badly counterproductive). 
12. See, e.g., Judson Starr et al., Prosecuting Pollution, LEGAL nMES, May 
31, 1993, at 6; Starr, supra note 7; Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., 
Environmental Crimes and the Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come ... 
and It ls Hard Time, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096, 10,104 (Mar. 
1990) ("one does not have to be bad to do bad when it comes to environmental 
crimes") (emphasis in original). 
13. These sorts of concerns are hardly limited to environmental law. Similar 
hesitations have clouded criminal prosecution in other nontraditional areas. More 
than three decades ago Sanford Kadish sounded most of these themes in an arti-
cle about the difficulties with criminal enforcement of economic regulations such 
as the antitrust laws. See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the 
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 423 (1963). Kadish pointed out the problems with criminal enforcement 
when the underlying substantive prohibitions are extremely vague, defendants 
generally take the corporate form and so the traditional sanctions lack their usual 
efficacy, and the proscribed behavior is not generally seen as morally reprehensi-
ble. Id. at 427-40. 
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the fact that what drives criminal enforcement in the environmental 
arena is its powerful deterrent effect. In practice, the criminal en-
forcement regime in environmental law does not exist to identify 
and prosecute the 200 or so worst offenders each year-those who 
cannot be made to comply except via the harshest sanction. It is not 
about ensuring compliance directly. Rather, it achieves compliance 
indirectly via the fear of penal sanction in those who might be 
prosecuted. As the attention lavished on the still quite unusual crim-
inal cases demonstrates, corporate managers who perceive civil 
penalties as a cost of doing business suddenly sit up and take notice 
when there is a chance they themselves might go to prison. 14 As is 
often pointed out, prison sentences are the one sanction that cannot 
be passed on to consumers or shareholders.15 
14. On the government's deterrent goals, see F. Henry Habicht II, The Feder-
al Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the 
Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,480 (Dec. 1987); EPA's 
Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 173 
(1993) (statement of Webster L. Hubbell, Assoc. Att'y Gen.) ("Nothing works 
better at getting managers to pay attention to environmental compliance than the 
prospect of going to prison .... ") [hereinafter 1993 Dingell Hearing]. 
15. Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The 
Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LoY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1133, 1158-59 (1986); James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforce-
ment Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 916, 922 ( 1991 ). 
A second justification for criminal environmental prosecutions is also some-
times found in their educational or denunciatory value. See generally Susan 
Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991). The choice of the criminal sanction registers 
social disapproval and teaches that environmental violations are serious indeed. 
This rationale can be, though it is not necessarily, simply a type of deterrence 
argument. That is, the reason we want to denounce and teach in this way is that 
potential violators, having heard the denunciation and learned the lesson, will 
comply. "If [the denouncer] believes that the point of declaring society's non-
toleration of this or that sort of law-breaking is to strengthen people's disapproval 
of it, and so reduce its frequency, he is simply a reducer [i.e., a believer in deter-
rence] who believes in a particular technique." NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, 
DANGER, AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22 (1980), quoted 
in JOHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
43 (2d ed. 1991). 
In any event, the denunciatory justification, whether it rests on an instru-
mental or a moral theory of punishment, is less likely to promote overprosecution 
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A preoccupation with the deterrent effect of harsh punishment is 
dangerous, because for a deterrence regime to function it is unnec-
essary, indeed it would be foolish, to prosecute all those who have 
committed equally serious violations. By definition, such even-
handedness is wasteful and duplicative. In addition, a deterrence 
rationale for punishment supports extraordinarily severe penalties. 
Thus, a single-minded concern with deterrence threatens to make 
prosecutors lose sight of critical constraints. To use an example my 
law school criminal law professor offered: If we really wanted to 
eliminate illegal parking, and deterrence was the only consideration, 
we need only cut off the hands of one illegal parker. 16 We do not 
do so, of course, because deterrence is not the only consideration. 
Concern for proportionality, equal treatment, and culpability, along 
with a moral hesitation over such raw instrumentalism, limit the 
range of possible punishments. 17 An exclusive focus on deterrence, 
unmodified by these other concerns, clearly risks excessive 
criminalization. 
I am not convinced that the list of prosecutorial abuses is all that 
long. Many writers seem concerned more with the threat than the 
reality, and the number of actual prosecutions that are deemed to 
have been excessive is minuscule. For example, Richard Lazarus's 
case studies all involve decisions not to prosecute that on their 
surface appear to be spineless concessions to lawbreakers but tum 
than is the justification based on the deterrent effect of severe punishment. Harsh 
penalties will educate up to a point, but if overdone they will simply backfire. 
The authorities can only get so far ahead of societal consensus. Were this the 
sole justification for criminal environmental prosecutions, there would be a good 
deal less to fear with regard to prosecutorial excess. 
16. The professor was Norval Morris. Cutting off hands (or heads) can also 
be used as an example of an incapacitation strategy run amok. James Q. Wilson 
observes: 
Incapacitation cannot be the sole purpose of the criminal justice sys-
tem; if it were, we would put everybody who has committed one or 
two offenses in prison until they were too old to commit another. And 
if we thought prison too costly, we would simply cut off their hands 
or their heads. Justice, humanity, and proportionality, among other 
goals, must also be served by the courts. 
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOlIT CRIME 145 (rev. ed. 1983). 
17. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and lnculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 
1435 (1995). 
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out to be instances where the prosecutors appropriately stayed their 
hands. 18 These are examples that the current system works, not 
that there is something wrong. In December 1995, the Washington 
Legal Foundation ("WLF') filed a petition with EPA objecting to 
overzealous enforcement. 19 The petition charged that "EPA is in-
creasingly foregoing administrative and civil remedies for environ-
mental infractions and is arbitrarily seeking felony criminal indict-
ments for even minor offenses."20 Yet the petition identified only 
four criminal indictments obtained by DOJ since 1989 that it al-
leged were inappropriate. 21 While the WLF may not have been 
trying to be comprehensive, one cannot help but think that if even 
the WLF can find only four such cases, perhaps the problem is not 
so great. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, just examining actual prosecutions 
is probably misleading. The government may be using the threat of 
criminal prosecution to extract civil settlements from potential 
defendants. Even if the inappropriate prosecution is rare, the possi-
bility of overprosecution must be taken seriously. 
In addition, a few real-world developments hint that the threat is 
growing. First, the resources allocated to criminal prosecution have 
recently been significantly increased. EPA hired its first criminal 
investigators in 1980; by 1990 one hundred people were conducting 
criminal investigations, including forty-seven special agents.22 That 
year the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 mandated a four-fold 
increase in investigators.23 While EPA does not quite have the full 
200 criminal investigators it was supposed to have by FY 1996, 24 
it had 150 investigators by Summer 1996, was about to hire 21 
more, and hoped to have the full complement of 200 by October 
18. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2409-10, 2496-507 (examining three case 
studies of DOJ criminal cases). 
19. WLF Says EPA Rule on Warnings Needed to Address "Overzealous" 
Investigators, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 22, 1995), available in LEXIS, 
Envirn. Library, BNAED file, (1995 DEN 246 dl 1). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Strock, supra note 15, at 917-19. 
23. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat. 2962 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)). 
24. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2. 
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1996.25 It is an inexorable law of bureaucracy that if large num-
bers of people are assigned to find something, that thing will be 
found, whether it is there or not. Thus, the increase in criminal 
investigators and prosecutors means that the government will bring 
more criminal prosecutions. Second, if one believes, as I do, that 
enhanced criminal enforcement is an effective deterrent, then com-
pliance ought to be increasing. If compliance is increasing, the 
number of appropriate criminal prosecutions should be decreasing. 
Yet that is not the case. No doubt this is primarily due to the fact 
that criminal prosecutions were artificially low in the past, but one 
cannot but worry about the future. 
Finally, government figures indicate that between 1992 and 1994 
indictments in environmental cases increased from 150 to 250, but 
total prison sentences rose only from 94.6 years to 99 years, while 
fines fell from $37.9 million to $36.8 million.26 Thus, punishment 
for each defendant has generally decreased as the number of defen-
dants has increased. This suggests that judges and juries are less 
persuaded that severe wrongdoing has taken place.27 
Again, none of this shows that federal prosecutors are running 
rampant. But the underlying concern is real and likely to become 
more pronounced in the future. The question is how to guard 
against the threat of overzealousness becoming a reality. 
B. Guidelines 
One answer may be guidelines.28 It is hard to be against guide-
lines and their promise of regularity, consistency, and the intelligent 
25. EPA to Add 21 Criminal Investigators, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 579 (July 
12, 1996). 
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying table. The fines figure is somewhat 
misleading in that the 1992 figure includes the assessment against Exxon for the 
Valdez spill. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2. 
27. To confirm this speculation would require, among other things, a careful 
examination of the role of the sentencing guidelines during the years in question. 
28. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2521-22. "The single most important [reform 
that the executive branch might undertake] is the establishment of guidelines for 
deciding whether a particular case warrants civil or criminal enforcement." Id. 
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exercise of discretion. However, in general, guidelines promise 
more than they deliver. 
First, numerous guidelines channeling prosecutorial discretion in 
this area already exist.29 These are not meaningless; no one asserts 
that criminal enforcement decisions have been totally inconsistent 
and ad hoc. But to the extent they have failed to date, that failure 
results less from defects in the particular guidelines that now exist 
than from the nature of guidelines. 
After all, what would better guidelines look like? Two types of 
changes might be made. First, the guidelines could be made more 
specific, pinning down with precision just what renders conduct 
sufficiently culpable and harmful to justify criminal prosecution. 
EPA' s most recent guideline is rather specific already, 30 so the 
29. From EPA, these include: Memorandum from Robert Perry, General 
Counsel to the Regional Counsels, "Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency" (Oct. 12, 1982); Memorandum from T. Adams, Jr. 
to Assistant Administrators, "Environmental Criminal Conduct coming to the 
Attention of Agency Officials and Employees" (Sept. 21, 1987); Memorandum 
from James Strock to Deputy Regional Administrations, "Regional Enforcement 
Management: Enhanced Regional Case Screening" (Oct. 10, 1990); Guidelines 
for Civil and Criminal Parallel Proceedings, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
35,159 (Oct. 1987); Memorandum from Earl Devaney, Director, Office of Crimi-
nal Enforcement, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the 
Criminal Enforcement Program, "The Exercise of Investigative Discretion" (Jan. 
12, 1994) [hereinafter Devaney Memorandum]; Incentives for Self-Policing: Dis-
covery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66706 
(1995) (relevant portions of which discuss extent to which defendant's own in-
vestigation and candor will cause EPA to forgo criminal prosecution). From OOJ, 
the guidance documents include Principles of Federal Prosecution, in U.S. OOJ, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 9-27.000 (commonly referred to as the "Unit-
ed States Attorneys' Manual" or "USAM") [hereinafter USAM]; Memorandum 
from Henry Habicht to the Deputy Attorney General, "Appropriateness of Incar-
ceration in Environmental Criminal Cases" (Sept. 5, 1986); Factors in Decisions 
on Criminal Prosecutions in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or 
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (July 1, 1991). See generally Joseph G. Block, 
The Government's Decision to Initiate an Investigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 21, 
22-33 (Donald A. Carr ed., 1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIA-
BILITY]. 
30. The 1994 Devaney memo identifies significant harm and culpable conduct 
as the touchstones of criminal liability and then identifies factors relevant to each 
of these considerations. Significant harm is a function of actual harm to human 
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idea would be to produce something extraordinarily detailed. But 
this approach will ultimately fail. The author of the guideline can-
not think of everything. The choice between different modes of 
enforcement is ultimately a judgment call depending on countless 
variables and arising in very different circumstances. As such, it 
lends itself more to a sort of "common law" rather than a "statuto-
ry" approach.31 Consider, for example, the Sentencing Guidelines, 
which are surely the maximum one might expect in specificity for 
prosecutorial guidelines. It is a standard complaint that the Sentenc-
ing Commission overlooked many relevant factors and inappropri-
ately limited judicial discretion.32 In trying to make sure like cases 
are treated alike, the Guidelines stand in the way of allowing unlike 
cases to be treated differently. 
health or the environment, the seriousness of threats of such harm, failure to 
report an actual discharge, and any trends or common attitudes within the regulat-
ed community that suggest the need for additional deterrence. With regard to 
culpability, the relevant factors are a history of repeated violations, deliberate 
misconduct, concealment of misconduct, falsification of records, tampering with 
monitoring equipment, and the failure to obtain permits. For a useful sketch of 
the criminal investigative process and the 1994 guidance, see Steven E. Chester, 
Environmental Crime and the EPA's Exercise of Criminal Investigative Discre-
tion, 73 MICH. BAR J. 1064 (1994). 
31. The inevitable drawbacks of highly specific instructions as a substitute for 
good judgment in fluid and varying situations were pointed out more than a cen-
tury ago by the remarkable Francis Lieber: 
Men have at length found out that little or nothing is gained by at-
tempting to speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications, 
but that human speech is the clearer, the less we endeavor to supply 
by words and specifications that interpretation which common sense 
must give to human words. However minutely we may define, some-
where we needs must trust at last to common sense and good faith. 
Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpreta-
tion and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and 
Authorities, 16 CAROOZO L. REv. 1883, 1905 (1995) (republication of 3rd ed., 
1880). See also id. at 1997-98 (noting superiority of general instructions over 
detailed regulations to guide someone negotiating on one's behalf); Michael 
Herz, Rediscovering Francis Lieber: An Afterword and Introduction, 16 
CAROOZO L. REV. 2107, 2122 n.68 (1995). 
32. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Commentary: The Death of Discretion? 
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 
(1988). 
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In short, guidelines or standards are a double-edged sword. On 
the one hand, they promote efficiency and consistency. Vague 
guidelines pose a relatively greater risk of inconsistent treatment 
than do clear and specific ones, while no standards pose the great-
est such risk. On the other hand, while guidelines can ensure that 
like cases are treated alike, they can also hide relevant differences. 
The discretion to tailor outcomes to individual circumstances is in 
essence a discretion to treat dissimilar cases differently. This is just 
as important an equality principle. 33 
The other route to improved guidelines would be to identify all 
the relevant factors, try to give them relative weights, and leave the 
prosecutor to evaluate the case in light thereof. However, experi-
ence has shown that at some point amassing ever more factors 
ceases to increase certainty, predictability, and consistency. To the 
contrary, a multitude of factors sends decision-making in the oppo-
site direction, ultimately imposing no constraint at all because any 
decision is justifiable. For example, the Corps of Engineers' multi-
factor public interest test suffers from this indeterminacy of com-
prehensiveness. 34 
In sum, if inconsistent and overzealous prosecutorial decision-
making is a problem, guidelines are unlikely to be the solution. 
C. Substantive Legal Changes 
Another alternative, beyond the scope of this article, but requiring 
brief mention, would be to change the underlying substantive legal 
standards for criminal liability. At the extreme, Congress could 
simply decriminalize violations of environmental laws. More mod-
estly, the courts might construe environmental regulations narrowly 
under the rule of lenity. 35 Yet another alternative, as other pieces 
33. Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1730 (1993). 
34. See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(l) (1995). 
35. For a comprehensive definition of the rule of lenity, see United States v. 
Koehler, 973 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1992). 
By providing lenient judicial readings, aggressive criminal enforcement 
might prove counterproductive from the environmentalist perspective. This point 
is made by Ted Schneyer, Business Lawyering and Value Creation for Clients: 
Fuu;y Models of the Corporate Lawyer as Environmental Compliance Counselor, 
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in the present symposium book discuss, is Congressional heighten-
ing of the thresholds of criminal environmental liability. 36 This 
could be done in various ways; for example, imposing a stricter 
mens rea requirement, mitigating sentences, or creating an environ-
mental audit privilege. 37 
Although this Article does not focus on the benefits of such 
changes, they would not be costless. 38 Such changes would proba-
bly eliminate many worthwhile cases along with the few excessive 
ones, and are not the only means of constraining prosecutors. 
D. Structural Responses - An Introduction 
Prosecutorial guidelines or substantive legal changes would be 
direct responses to the perceived problem of excessive enthusiasm 
for criminal sanctions. Indirect responses, in the form of structural 
arrangements, would be equally, if not more, effective at minimiz-
ing abuse. In fact, a good many structural protections are in place. 
It is always useful to ask not "why are things so bad," but, "why 
aren't things a thousand times worse." With regard to criminal 
environmental enforcement, the answer is primarily structural. The 
system is already set up to minimize abuses. 
First, the terms of this debate seem almost to equate the decision 
to seek an indictment with a criminal conviction. A U.S. Attorney 
cannot convict. All she can do is ask a grand jury to indict (which 
it will, of course) and a jury to convict (which it may or may not). 
These are constitutional limits on how abusive the prosecutor can 
be. Conviction is not automatic; the prosecutor has to convince the 
judge and jury that a criminal offense has indeed taken place. To be 
sure, in the real world the prosecutor is usually able to do so; the 
federal government's conviction rate is very high.39 However, this 
74 OR. L. REV. 99, 117 (1995). 
36. For a discussion concerning mens rea and environmental crimes see 
Richard J. Lazarus, Mens Rea in Environmental Law: Reading Supreme Court 
Tea Leaves, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 861 (1996). 
37. See Linda A. Spahr, Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: The Straw That 
Breaks the Back of Criminal Prosecutions, 1 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 635 (1996). 
38. Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environ-
mental Criminals: A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2531 (1995). 
39. Estimates vary, and the rate changes over time, but DOJ obtains a convic-
692 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII 
does not mean that the jury is a meaningless rubber stamp; it means 
that the cases are not so extravagant after all. 
Second, even if it is "too easy" to obtain a criminal conviction 
for an environmental offense, it is still much harder to obtain a 
criminal conviction than a civil penalty for the same offense - the 
standard of proof is higher, _the investigatory and evidentiary re-
quirements more stringent, the resources required greater. Yet the 
civil penalty can be a powerful sanction. Apart from prison time for 
individuals, financial sanctions are just as great in civil as in crimi-
nal cases.40 Furthermore, because the government must discount 
the amount of the penalty by the probability of obtaining it, the 
expected penalty from a civil proceeding will be higher in precisely 
those borderline situations which may not be appropriate criminal 
prosecutions, since the chances of prevailing civilly are higher than 
the chances of obtaining a criminal conviction. Finally, just as EPA 
prefers administrative enforcement to judicial enforcement in large 
measure because it is quicker and easier,41 so EPA should prefer 
tion about 80% or 90% of the time. Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, Crim-
inal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: The Responsible Corporate Officer 
Doctrine - Can You Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?, 22 Envtl. L. 1347, 
1348 & n.4 (1992). 
40. The congruence of civil and criminal sanctions might be cause for concern 
that civil sanctions are too severe, but that is a topic for another day. 
41. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular 
Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is 
Shared by the United States, the States, and their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 
1552, 1613-14 (1995). The other reason EPA prefers administrative to judicial 
enforcement is that it handles administrative cases itself, without involvement (or 
interference) from DOJ. From EPA' s point of view, once the case has been re-
ferred to DOJ, it is out of the agency's control regardless of whether it will be 
pursued criminally or civilly. As discussed below, one way to reduce EPA crimi-
nal referrals and place greater emphasis on civil enforcement would probably be 
to ensure that EPA itself played the lead role in civil actions, at which point the 
natural bureaucratic urge to protect turf would discourage criminal referrals in 
favor of civil cases. 
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civil judicial enforcement to criminal judicial enforcement. 42 Crim-
inal prosecutions are hardly the path of least resistance. 
A third aspect of the enforcement structure further protects 
against overreaching, namely. the division of authority between 
EPA, the USAOs, and Main Justice. It is to the allocation of inves-
tigative and prosecutorial responsibility among these three that the 
rest of this Article is devoted. 
II. THE DIVISION OF LmGA TING AUTHORITY 
Congress has established the Department of Justice as the litiga-
tor for the United States and its administrative agencies. Agencies 
may not employ outside counsel for litigation; they must refer all 
matters to DOJ. 43 DOJ then handles the litigation: 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation 
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, 
or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to 
officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the 
Attorney General. 44 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General 
shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, 
42. As then Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell told John Dingell: 
Civil and administrative remedies can present a number of advantages 
from the government's perspective, and we have followed criminal 
investigations with civil cases in some situations. The burden of proof 
is lower, and there are fewer limits on admissibility of evidence. The 
penalties in civil actions can be quite substantial, with correspondingly 
high deterrent effect, and there is a broad range of injunctive relief 
available. Given the range of relief and penalties available, a decision 
to bring civil rather than criminal charges should not be viewed as a 
"weaker" enforcement approach. 
1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 186 (statement of Webster L. Hubbell, 
Assoc. Attorney General). 
43. 
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of an executive de-
partment or military department may not employ an attorney or coun-
sel for the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, 
or employee thereof is a party, or is interested, or for the securing of 
evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to the Department of Jus-
tice. 
5 u.s.c. § 3106 (1994). 
44. 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1994). 
694 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII 
or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States attor-
neys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys ap-
pointed under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their 
respective duties. 45 
With regard to criminal prosecution, DOJ's preeminence goes 
largely unquestioned. On the civil side, however, it is a source of 
continuing controversy. Congress has carved out a variety of 
exceptions to DOJ control, particularly among the independent 
agencies,46 and periodically threatens to create more. From 
DOJ' s perspective, it must constantly be on guard against the 
dilution of its proper role as lawyer for the government.47 As for 
the agencies, all have chafed under the arrangement to a greater 
or lesser extent. Thus, in the words of one former head of DOJ's 
Civil Division, "[t]he warfare over litigation authority never 
ends .... "48 
A. DOJ' s Perspective on Its Control of Litigation 
DOJ has a well-rehearsed pitch for centralized litigating author-
ity. First, it frequently asserts the absolute necessity that the gov-
ernment speak with one voice in the courts.49 This idea has two 
45. Id. § 519. 
46. See generally Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-
Making at Independent Agencies, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL 
LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL PoLmcs 181, 182-89 (Cornell w. 
Clayton ed., 1995). 
47. See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal 
Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1059 (1978); The Attorney General's Role as Chief 
Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982). 
48. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil 
Division, 23 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 186 (1990). 
49. See, e.g., Summary by Department of Justice, reprinted in 118 CONG. 
REC. 21,882, 21,883 (1972) (stressing the "need for uniformity in the litigating 
positions of the United States"); Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial 
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 187 (1979) [here-
inafter Proceedings) (transcript of comment of Lois Schiffer, currently the head 
of DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division) ("[Among) biggest griev-
ances of outside regulated organizations is that the Government speaks to them in 
conflicting voices, ... one of the ways that those conflicting voices can be made 
less conflicting is to centralize both criminal and civil enforcement authority for 
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components. In part, it is about consistency and uniform posi-
tions: the federal government should not argue for broad defer-
ence to agency interpretation or reliance on legislative history one 
day and against it the next. In addition, it is about avoiding con-
flict between parts of the executive branch in court. Without the 
need to rely on DOJ for representation, individual agencies might 
be facing off in court - a prospect that, depending on one's 
point of view, may be embarrassing, unseemly, destructive to 
sound policy, or unconstitutional.50 Thus, the single voice princi-
ple seems an amalgam of different concerns: protecting turf, a 
quasi-aesthetic distaste for governmental inconsistency, an equal 
protection sort of idea about treating like cases alike, and a worry 
that inconsistency will make the United States a less-effective liti-
gant. 
Closely related to the "one voice" principle is a concern about 
authority. If the government speaks with two contradictory voic-
es, at least one of those will not be the President's. If one begins 
with the premise that the executive branch is unitary and must 
reflect the President's views and policies, for which the President 
will and should be held accountable, then the system has broken 
down if parts of the branch are taking inconsistent positions. 
D01' s Office of Legal Counsel concludes that 
it is essential that the Attorney General not relinquish his supetvi-
sory authority over the agency's litigation functions, for the Attor-
ney General alone is obligated to represent the broader interests of 
the Executive. It is this responsibility to ensure that the interests of 
the United States as a whole, as articulated by the Executive, are 
given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests 
between subordinate segments of the government of the United 
States which uniquely justifies the role of the Attorney General as 
the chief litigator for the United States. Only the Attorney General 
has the overall perspective to perform this function.51 
the same statute in one place[, i.e., OOJ] .... "); The Attorney General's Role as 
Chief Litigator for the United States, supra note 47. 
50. On intragovemmental litigation in general, see Michael Herz, United 
States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself!, 32 WM. 
& MARYL. REV. 893 (1991). 
51. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 
supra note 47, at 54 (emphasis in original). 
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Third, for DOJ, the expertise of the litigator is litigation; DOJ 
lawyers have courtroom skills and familiarity with recurrent non-
agency-specific legal questions that agency lawyers lack.52 The 
agency itself will benefit from having top-notch litigators repre-
senting it.53 DOJ does not _claim the agency lawyer's detailed 
familiarity with the specifics of particular statutes or programs. 
To the contrary, it suggests that the generalist's more passing 
familiarity can be an advantage, since the judicial audience that 
must be convinced also consists of generalists. Finally, DOJ 
lawyers are superior at choosing cases as vehicles to advance 
certain policies because they are more familiar with trends within 
the judiciary and the tendencies of particular judges. 54 
Finally, in what may be seen as a variation of the expertise 
argument, DOJ also stresses the fact that it is a neutral and objec-
tive evaluator of the agency's case. In the words of Edward 
Schmults, former Deputy Attorney General: "The Attorney 
General's role in providing neutral, dispassionate analysis of and 
advice concerning controversial issues cannot be overstated."55 
This objectivity is two-fold. First, the DOJ is not involved in the 
particulars of agency policymaking and its attorneys will not have 
their judgment skewed by a personal stake in the matter at hand. 
Second, it lies in the separation of the prosecutorial function from 
the investigatory and regulatory functions. This, asserts Schmults, 
"has proven to be helpful in assuring that litigation is initiated 
52. E.g., Babcock, supra note 48, at 186. 
53. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 49, at 175 (statement of Associate 
Attorney General Michael Egan) ("[T]he Department of Justice ideally should 
have the best litigators there are in the United States, and to the extent that we 
start deffusing [sic] among agencies, litigation expertise, the whole thing will go 
down."). 
54. DoNALD L. HOROWTIZ, THE JUROCRACY: GoVERNMENT LA WYERS, 
AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 130 (1976). 
55. Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, to Rep. James 
Florio, May 4, 1983, at 2, in Hazardous Waste Control and Enforcement Act of 
1983: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism 
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 387, 388 
(1983). 
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upon an objective, independent evaluation of the factual and legal 
basis of each case. "56 
B. The Agency Perspective on DOJ Control of Litigation 
The agencies are rather underwhelmed by this catalogue of 
benefits. In part, this is the expected personal and professional re-
sentment that naturally results from being told to step aside by 
someone with greater power and prestige (who is often also 
younger and with less experience) just when a controversy be-
comes most important and most interesting. 57 In addition, from 
the point of view of the agency, the necessity for speaking with 
one voice is far less obvious than it is to DOJ, and the likelihood 
of it actually occurring in the large bulk of agency-specific litiga-
tion is rather remote. 
Beyond simply being unconvinced by DOJ's arguments, the 
agencies perceive a host of difficulties resulting from centralizing 
litigation authority in the Department.58 In large measure, these 
are intensely practical. Referring cases to DOJ and relying on it 
to pursue them is wasteful, time-consuming, and expensive. Cases 
are redundantly staffed. DOJ does not adequately consult with the 
agency or involve its attorneys in briefing and arguing cases. 
Notwithstanding their vaunted expertise in litigation, DOJ lawyers 
lack the technical expertise and specialized background in the 
particular statutory regimes of the individual agencies. The diver-
gence here is more than one of different areas of expertise. As a 
generalization, there is a difference in lawyering style. DOJ has a 
greater tendency to rely on "technical" arguments such as sover-
56. Id. at 389. 
57. See, e.g., Wallace H. Johnson, Our Nation's Energy and Re-
sources-Decision Making in Conflict, 23 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 197, 200 
(1990) (former chief of the Lands Division observing that "client agency lawyers 
were often professionally unfulfilled, being limited to taking recommendations. 
Understandably, they wanted the power and opportunity to follow a litigation 
matter through to its conclusion"). On this tension, see generally JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 76-77 (1995) 
(noting destructive "institutional rivalry" that peaked in the late 1970s and mid to 
late 1980s, prompting "discord between the agency and its Justice Department 
attorneys [that] affected enforcement in all environmental media"). 
58. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 332-37 (1977). 
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eign immunity, lack of jurisdiction, statute of limitations, and so 
on - defenses that win the case but do nothing to advance the 
agency's programmatic agenda. By the same token, agencies are 
somewhat more inclined to run litigation risks - willing to lose 
the case (which is a means, not an end) in the hope of advancing 
that agenda. 
Furthermore, where DOJ asserts the need to reconcile different 
agency positions and ensure intra-executive uniformity, the agen-
cies see only a conflict of interest. Because DOJ represents multi-
ple federal agencies, and because different agencies' interests will 
not always align precisely, the current arrangement is rife with 
the potential for conflicts of interest that would be unacceptable 
in the private sector. These may be indirect, as where DOJ talces 
a position on behalf of one agency that is in the abstract in ten-
sion with another's agenda or goals, or, the conflict may be quite 
direct, where DOJ' s representation of one governmental interest 
leads to a direct interference with another's policy program or 
goals. 
The working relationship between DOJ and EPA is often diffi-
cult and strained. As the former head of EPA' s enforcement 
division put it in a letter to the head of the Environment Division, 
a "division . . . has infused itself between our two agencies" 
characterized by a "'them vs. us' perception that we have long 
been working to overcome. "59 
59. Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforce-
ment, to Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and 
Natural Resources Division, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra 
note 14, at 420, 421. Sniping over lawyering authority in itself has costs; it is a 
distraction, lowers morale, and undermines effective working relationships. As a 
former head of the Environmental Crimes Section has written: 
The1environmental enforcement program is ... plagued by constant 
turf fights between the DOJ and EPA over who will actually litigate 
the cases in court. The tension from these turf battles is always sim-
mering, and frequently affects the relationship between the DOJ attor-
ney and his EPA counterpart. Unfortunately, such tension is an unnec-
essary drain of energy that could be better spent in developing and 
prosecuting enforcement cases. 
Judson W. Starr, Too Many Cooks ... , ENVTL. F. (JanJFeb. 1989) at 9, 11. 
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C. EPA and DOI: Civil Judicial Enforcement 
A civil judicial environmental enforcement action begins with a 
referral from EPA to DOJ. DOJ will not go ahead with a civil ac-
tion on its own initiative; its only authority is to proceed on 
EPA' s behalf. If DOJ does decline, EPA can in theory proceed on 
its own, as this Article discusses below. Declinations of EPA 
civil referrals are fairly rare,60 in part because of the possibility 
of EPA representing itself. 61 
Several of the environmental statutes do contain exceptions to 
the Attorney General's exclusive representation. The CAA,62 the 
CWA,63 and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA")64 all pro-
vide that the Administrator shall first request the Attorney Gener-
al for representation in a civil action; if the Attorney General 
declines, EPA attorneys shall represent the agency.65 The Toxic 
60. Exact figures on the frequency of declinations are not published. By com-
paring EPA's figures on referrals with DOJ's figures for cases initiated, a rough 
estimate can be made, however. See Hodas, supra note 41, at 1613-14 & n.348. 
By comparing EPA and DOJ figures for FY 1989 through FY 1993, Hodas co-
mes up with an overall acceptance rate of 78% (using EPA figures) or 83% (us-
ing DOJ figures). Id. It is unclear whether this is limited to civil referrals or 
includes criminal referrals as well. 
DOJ virtually never declines to defend EPA (or any other agency) in law-
suits brought against the government. The author is aware of only one case in 
which EPA defended itself in court with its own lawyers after DOJ refused to 
represent it. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 631 F.2d 922 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). The agency won. 
61. It is unclear to what extent DOJ is concerned about the possibility of EPA 
pursuing a case without it. It has almost never happened, and so hardly seems an 
imminent threat. On the other hand, one reason it has never happened is surely 
that DOJ is unlikely to decline a case that EPA so firmly believes in that it will 
proceed on its own. 
The reasons for the low number of declinations go beyond a simple desire 
to avoid EPA going into court on its own. To some extent, DOJ does see EPA as 
a client, and if the client wants to bring a suit, then the lawyer's job is to bring it. 
Cf supra note 6 (higher declination rate in criminal cases). And to some extent 
EPA is careful about what it refers, because it does not want to be turned down. 
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, CAA §§ 101-618 (1994). 
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, CWA §§ 101-607 (1994). 
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26, Public Health Service Act §§ 1401-1464 
(1994) & Pub. L. 100-572 § 4 (1988). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7605, CAA § 305 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1366, CWA § 506 
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Substances Control Act ("TSCA")66 allows the Administrator to 
use her own attorneys to bring a civil action in the case of an 
imminent hazard even without approaching DOJ.67 
However, EPA virtually never uses its theoretical authority to 
represent itself. In 1977, DOJ and EPA negotiated a Memoran-
dum of Understanding ("MOU") concerning the handling of civil 
litigation in which the agency is a party.68 The MOU remains in 
effect today. Under the MOU, the Attorney General ("AG") 
"shall have control over all cases" in which the agency is a par-
ty. 69 EPA is entitled to designate an attorney to participate in the 
litigation, even though that attorney "shall be subject to the su-
pervision and control of' the AG.70 Agency attorneys cannot 
make any filings without the AG's approval. They may discuss 
the case with DOJ attorneys, help prepare and sign papers, en-
gage in settlement discussions, and may be allowed to argue oral-
ly. However, DOJ attorneys take the lead role; they are listed first 
on all filings, make ultimate decisions concerning strategy and 
the contents of papers submitted to the court, and make virtually 
all oral arguments.71 The author's review of sixty cases decided 
between January 1993 and October 1994, in which EPA was a 
party, showed that DOJ attorneys argued fifty-five, EPA attorneys 
two, and the agencies shared oral argument in four. 
Congress has seriously considered giving EPA its own litigat-
ing authority on several occasions. The MOU was negotiated in 
the shadow of an explicit and apparently serious threat from 
Congress to give EPA authority to represent itself should it and 
DOJ be unable to reach an agreement.72 The 1984 RCRA 
(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(f), SWDA § 1450(f) (1994). 
66. 15 u.s.c. §§ 2601-2692 (1994). 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(e), TSCA § 7(e) (1994) ("Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, in any action under subsection (a) of this section [concerning 
imminent chemical hazards] , the Administrator may direct attorneys of the [EPA] 
to appear and represent the Administrator in such an action."). 
68. U.S. OOJ, Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of Justice 
and Environmental Protection Agency, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,942 (1977). 
69. Id. at 48,943. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. The House version of what became the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 
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Amendments almost included a provision giving EPA litigation 
authority.73 This issue has come up on other occasions as well. 
In general, Congress perceives, rightly, that EPA is more commit-
ted to enforcement than DOJ. To the extent that moves to shift 
authority to EPA reflect a reasoned policy judgment, rather than a 
mere political bargaining chip or an evaluation of whom Con-
gress can most easily control, Congress becomes interested in 
having EPA (or any agency) handle its own litigation when it 
most doubts the current administration's commitment to enforce-
ment. 
D. EPA and DOJ: The Criminal Side 
To some extent, the criminal enforcement regime duplicates the 
civil. 74 EPA has its own criminal investigatory apparatus, and it 
will make an initial decision whether to pursue a case as a crimi-
nal or a civil matter. If and when it refers to DOJ, EPA will 
request criminal or civil prosecution. However, DOJ can bring a 
criminal environmental prosecution without a referral from EPA. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and others also 
undertake criminal investigations. In addition, DOJ brings a pros-
ecution on behalf of the United States, not the Administrator. As 
a result, DOJ's criminal environmental enforcement program 
operates with greater independence from EPA than does its civil 
judicial enforcement program. 
The decision to proceed with a criminal investigation is made 
by EPA' s Office of Criminal Enforcement. 75 EPA' s efforts are 
supplemented by agents from the FBl.76 Between 1988 and 
explicitly provided for EPA litigating authority. See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra 
note 5, at 332-37. The final legislation provided that litigation should take place 
"in accordance with" the MOU. 42 U.S.C. § 7605(b), CAA§ 305(b) (1977). 
73. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 4. For a full account of the process of criminal investigation and prosecution, 
see ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 29. 
75. See Devaney Memorandum, supra note 29, at 1-2. 
76. See Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of Enforcement 
Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (1982). 
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1993, for example, over 61 % of criminal referrals came from 
EPA and 34% came from DOJ investigators, with almost all of 
the latter coming from the FBl.77 Almost all of the FBI's envi-
ronmental investigations are conducted in conjunction with EPA 
or other agencies.78 The decision to proceed with a criminal 
prosecution, as opposed to a criminal investigation, is up to DOJ. 
However, EPA makes what is in essence a recommendation by 
referring a case for criminal prosecution. 
The role of EPA attorneys in criminal prosecutions is less 
significant than in civil cases. In the latter, DOJ takes the lead, 
but EPA is part of the litigating team. In criminal cases, EPA 
truly is just a counseling agency, helping to build a case. While 
each EPA Region has a Regional Criminal Enforcement Counsel 
("RCEC"), that office works to prepare cases, not to litigate them 
or present them to a grand jury. Indeed, the RCEC's status as 
"odd man out" in criminal prosecutions has been a source of 
tension between the agency and the department. 79 
The one exception to this arrangement is the occasional ap-
pointment of an EPA attorney as a "Special Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney." DOJ, however, is wary of granting such status freely. Prior 
to the August 1994 bluesheet, this reluctance was palpable in the 
U.S. Attorneys' Manual.80 Indeed, the January 1993 revision, 
since withdrawn, expressly stated that only in the event that no 
Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") or ECS attorney was 
available would DOJ "resort to other resources, such as agency 
counsel."81 During preparation of the January 1993 revisions, the 
head of EPA's enforcement office objected to the exclusion of 
EPA attorneys from criminal prosecutions. The Acting Assistant 
AG for the Environment Division responded: 
11. See 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 78 (statement of L. Nye 
Stevens). 
78. Id. at n.13. 
79. Wn.LIAM J. CORCORAN ET AL., UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTER-
NAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PRO-
GRAM 146-52 (Mar. 10, 1994) [hereinafter OOJ INTERNAL REVIEW] (noting that 
disputes over the proper role of RCECs is "[a]nother source of tension between 
the EPA and the ECS"); id. at 151; Letter from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 59. 
80. USAM, supra note 29, § 5-11.312 (10/1/88); id. (1/12/93 Bluesheet). 
81. Id.§ 5-ll.303(E) (1/12/93 Bluesheet). 
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It is always important for federal enforcement employees to 
work together to bring about the best possible result. This does not 
mean, however, that RCECs, or any Agency counsel, should pros-
ecute environmental cases. The role of litigator is that of the De-
partment of Justice under the overall direction of the Attorney 
General. It is our view that Agency counsel should only litigate a 
criminal case when DOJ resources are lacking or when there is a 
need to supplement those resources.82 
The current USAM simply provides that appointment of Special 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys shall be approved by the local U.S. 
Attorney and by the head of the Environment Division, who 
"should seek to ensure sensible and efficient use of government 
resources. "83 
EPA' s role in criminal cases is relatively less significant not 
only in the actual handling of the case but in the decision to 
bring it in the first place. First, in a civil case DOJ will not pro-
ceed without its "client." In the words of the USAM, "[a]s a 
matter of policy and practice, civil prosecutions are initiated at 
the request of the Administrator" of the EPA or other relevant 
agency head.84 Indeed, the most plausible reading of the statutes 
is that DOJ could not proceed in a civil case without EPA even if 
it wanted to. Should DOJ learn of possible violations warranting 
investigation, it will forward the information to EPA; an actual 
civil prosecution will not go forward unless and until EPA refers 
the case to DOJ. 85 In contrast, in criminal prosecutions DOJ is 
permitted to, and sometimes does, proceed without an EPA refer-
ral. 86 In addition, DOJ by no means automatically pursues an 
EPA criminal referral; its declination rate is higher in criminal 
than in civil cases87 and the recurrent tension between DOJ and 
82. Letter from Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Earl 
E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement 2 (Jan. 19, 1993), 
reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 433-34. 
83. USAM, supra, note 29, § 5-11.110 (8/23/94 Bluesheet). 
84. Id.§ 5-12.lll(A). 
85. Id. § 5-12.1 ll(B). 
86. Id. 
87. In the early years of the criminal enforcement program the declination rate 
was as high as 60%. Starr, supra note 7, at 907 (describing period from 1979-
81). 
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EPA over the quality of EPA referrals is especially pronounced in 
the criminal setting. 88 In a criminal case, DOJ represents the 
United States; EPA is not its client and DOJ's decision whether 
to prosecute is relatively autonomous. 89 
Ill. ALLOCATING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT REsPONSIBILITY 
The battle over the relative roles of Main Justice and the 
USAOs raged without a thought given to the possible place of 
EPA in the overall arrangement.90 As we have seen, however, 
the role of EPA lawyers in the agency's litigation is a matter of 
longstanding discussion and controversy.91 Although this contro-
versy has focused on civil litigation, EPA has also sought, to a 
limited extent, a greater courtroom role in criminal prosecu-
tions.92 Some commentators have argued EPA should possess 
some independent criminal enforcement authority.93 This Section 
88. See DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 79. 
89. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460. 
90. A fact that did not go unnoticed by EPA and its supporters. See, e.g., 
Howard Berman, Ex-EPA Staffer Says Environmental Crime Needs Open Debate, 
LEGAL llMES, Aug. 10, 1992, at 25 (letter to the editor) (stressing central but 
overlooked role of EPA in environmental criminal enforcement in response to 
DOJ's defense of the ECS's performance); Letter from John Voorhees to Janet 
Reno (June 23, 1993) at 3, reprinted in 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 
463-65 (objecting that EPA's "career professionals were not even consulted to as-
sist in the preparation of the guidelines," i.e. the bluesheet revision, and that 
DOJ's "failure ... to contact EPA contributes to the specter of impropriety"). 
91. Supra nn. 43-59 and accompanying text. 
92. See DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 79, at 146-52 (noting strains 
between ECS and EPA and desire of many RCECs to participate in prosecu-
tions); Letter from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal Enforce-
ment, to Vicki A. O'Meara, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment and 
Natural Resources Division, at 2 (Dec. 22, 1992), reprinted in 1993 Dingell 
Hearing, supra note 14, at 420-21 (objecting to bluesheet revisions that leave 
EPA attorneys out of the picture). 
93. Writing about environmental crimes in 1991, Robert Adler and Charles 
Lord, of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., urged that EPA be given 
greater independent enforcement authority. While conceding that DOJ should be 
"brought in for the most egregious violations that require more complex enforce-
ment actions[,]" Adler and Lord felt that EPA should be able to act on its own 
for initial or less complicated violations. Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Envi-
ronmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781, 812 (1991). 
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considers whether in fact EPA should represent the government 
in criminal environmental prosecutions. It concludes that it should 
not, because DOJ control (or, more precisely, shared control) is 
an important structural protection against prosecutorial overreach-
ing with only minor costs. 
A. Vigorous Enforcement 
Much of the debate that has taken place about the allocation of 
prosecutorial authority concerns whether enforcement is suffi-
ciently vigorous. Although prosecutorial timidity is worth worry-
ing about, the question this Article examines is in some ways the 
opposite: viz., what allocation of prosecutorial authority will 
ensure that enforcement is not too vigorous? 
1. EPA vs. DOJ 
EPA refers more cases than DOJ brings; its attorneys are gen-
erally more committed to the environmental cause.94 The dupli-
cation of effort inherent in referral by EPA and prosecution by 
DOJ automatically reduces enforcement resources. In light of this, 
it would seem that enforcement would be enhanced by allowing 
EPA to bring its own prosecutions.95 The concern, however, is 
with agency lawyers armed with independent criminal prosecution 
authority going too far. 
94. Again, DOJ's common argument that the neutral, distanced perspective of 
the generalist is necessary to counter the tunnel vision of the agency is much less 
applicable in the environmental setting (or tax, antitrust, or civil rights settings, 
for that matter), where DOJ also has specialized attorneys whose choice of a 
career likely reflects some sympathy for a particular policy agenda. 
95. See Adler & Lord, supra note 93, at 812. I would note too much can be 
read into these factors. In particular, the fact that EPA refers more cases than 
DOJ is willing to prosecute does not mean that EPA would prosecute all the 
cases it refers if it had the authority to do so. At present, EPA (and EPA's 
overseers) measure enforcement success by how many cases are referred. For the 
U.S. Attorney, in contrast, the measure of success is how many cases she wins, 
making her far more risk averse in litigation. Furthermore, EPA can refer border-
line cases because it knows DOJ is there as a screen. If EPA had DOJ's job, it 
would behave more like DOJ. 
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a. Single-mindedness 
Generations of administrative law scholars and DOJ attorneys 
have assumed that agencies have tunnel vision and are unable to 
perceive countervailing factors that would make a reasonable 
person hesitate about the agency's single-minded pursuit of its 
particular mission. If the problem is prosecution for morally 
blameless conduct that violates an incomprehensible technicality, 
then EPA attorneys with specialized expertise and commitment to 
environmental law are more likely to fall prey to such overreach-
ing. Not only are they likely to have a commitment to environ-
mental enforcement, but they know the statutes perhaps too well, 
failing to appreciate how overwhelming and confusing they are to 
someone whose entire job is not devoted to understanding them. 
b. Lawyering styles 
Certain differences in lawyering style can be identified between 
DOJ and EPA. These are dangerous generalizations, of course, 
and . one can find many counterexamples. Furthermore, were EPA 
to be granted independent litigating authority, its lawyers' style 
would likely change to look more like DOJ's. Nonetheless, two 
general points can be made. Because DOJ lawyers are, relatively 
speaking, generalists without an affiliation to a particular pro-
grammatic agenda, they tend to be more interested in "technical" 
lawyer's arguments, and less willing to run litigation risks, than 
their agency counterparts. These attributes can be frustrating to 
agency lawyers, particularly in defensive cases, but they are im-
portant safeguards in the criminal context. 
c. An example 
A well-known dispute between DOJ and EPA, involving civil 
rather than criminal enforcement, illustrates this divergence. 96 In 
the mid- l 970s, EPA referred cases to DOJ for judicial enforce-
ment even where no showing of harm could be made - for 
example, where the violation was purely "procedural" (e.g., in-
volving monitoring or recordkeeping requirements). DOJ often 
96. The following account is taken from PETER CLEARY YEAGER, THE LIMITS 
OF LAW: THE PuBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 259-63 (1991). 
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declined to pursue these cases. This led to a memorandum from 
EPA headquarters to DOJ, accusing the latter of "amending" the 
statute and asking DOJ to inform the U.S. Attorneys "of the 
correct interpretation of [EPA] statutes and the importance of 
prosecuting [EPA] enforcement cases without requiring proof of 
harm. "97 DOJ responded that it did not endorse a flat refusal to 
reject referrals in cases where there was no proof of environmen-
tal harm. However, it insisted that in its experience "the only 
assured way of receiving meaningful relief is a showing by the 
Government of some adverse effect of the defendant's pollutants, 
and in addition, some courts require it. This is a fact which can-
not be ignored. "98 It accordingly declined to issue any hard and 
fast rule to the U.S. Attorneys, leaving degree of harm as one 
factor relevant to the prosecutor's discretionary decision to go 
ahead. 
This is the sort of disagreement one would expect. EPA focus-
es on its statutes rather than the general principles of liability or 
of prosecutorial strategy. In Richard Lazarus's terms, EPA's 
position represents an overzealous failure to integrate environ-
mental law - with its risk-based, prophylactic, complex require-
ments - into more general principles.99 
2. Main Justice vs. the U.S. Attorneys Offices 
Representative Dingell was convinced that (at least in Republi-
can administrations) political pressure to go easy on environmen-
tal enforcement was most effectively brought to bear on Main 
Justice. 100 In certain cases, depending on who happens to be 
working in a particular USAO, he is probably correct. This, how-
97. Id. at 261 (quoting EPA Headquarters Enforcement Memorandum, regard-
ing correspondence between EPA and the Justice Department on problems in 
enforcement, Dec. 3, 1976) [hereinafter, EPA Enforcement Memorandum]. 
98. Id. at 262 (quoting EPA Enforcement Memorandum). 
99. See Lazarus, supra note 1. 
100. See 1993 Dingell Hearing, supra note 14, at 208 (statement of Rep. 
Dingell) (referring to the "perception," which he evidently shared, "that centraliz-
ing decision-making on environmental cases in Washington, D.C., opens the door 
to special preference, influence- peddling, and invites the use of pressure and 
special privilege ... on behalf of the rich and powerful"). 
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ever, is not because Main Justice is accessible and partisan while 
the USA Os are not. On the contrary, as then Associate Attorney 
General Webster Hubbell responded to Dingell, "I don't know 
that political pressure is limited to Washington, D.C."101 Indeed, 
local susceptibility to political pressure has been a complaint of 
the environmental defense bar: "Th[e] growing independence [of 
the USAOs] presents a serious problem for many companies 
facing RCRA enforcement actions, as the [USAOs] are typically 
more political than the Environment Division at DOJ headquar-
ters."102 
This is hardly a surprise, given that the position of U.S. Attor-
ney is a common stepping stone to elected office - something 
that is completely untrue of positions with the Environment Divi-
sion. There is, therefore, more reason to worry about politics, or 
at least political ambition, infecting prosecutorial decisions locally 
than in Washington. In New York, for example, Dennis Vacco, 
the state Attorney General, an elected official, is the former U.S. 
Attorney for the Western District of New York, and the Mayor of 
New York City, Rudolph Giuliani, is the former U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York. Indeed, Mayor Giuliani 
gained popularity by bringing a series of highly publicized, quite 
controversial white collar prosecutions. Many of the resulting 
convictions were overturned on appeal, 103 and there is a strong 
school of thought that holds that these prosecutions were wholly 
101. Id. (testimony of Webster L. Hubbell, Assoc. Att'y Gen.). See also 
Galacatos, supra note 3, at 656 (suggesting that risk of partisan pressure infecting 
prosecutorial decisions is roughly equal in the U.S. Attorneys Offices and at 
Main Justice). 
102. THE RCRA PRACTICE MANuAL 225 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1994). 
103. United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991), 946 F.2d 188 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (setting aside securities convictions of four of six defendants); United 
States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991) (setting aside conviction). 
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misguided, 104 nonetheless, they helped make Giuliani 
mayor. 105 
This is not to say that politically ambitious U.S. Attorneys will 
always be aggressive environmental prosecutors. To the contrary, 
political responsiveness cuts both ways; prosecutors have a long 
tradition of winking at offenses by locally prominent figures or 
important corporations. In the vast majority of USAOs, no one is 
especially interested in or enthusiastic about environmental crimi-
nal prosecutions. In many situations, then, it seems likely that 
decentralization will reduce enforcement. 
By comparison, ECS is more isolated and less accessible and 
more reliably committed to environmental prosecutions. To the 
extent that ECS is subject to outside pressure, it is likely to be 
pressured to hold off rather than pressured to pursue. Overall, the 
happy balance of attention to environmental crimes and overall 
restraint is more likely to come from ECS than local U.S. Attor-
neys. 
3. Summary 
One would expect the most vigorous broad-based environmen-
tal enforcement from EPA; the least from AUSAs (with isolated 
but highly visible and troubling individual counter-examples); and 
something in-between from ECS. The reality is probably not so 
different. A focus on individual instances (which may have been 
misinterpreted)106 at the expense of what is essentially invisible 
104. See generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY 
MICHAEL MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995). Something of the 
political flavor surrounding the office is discerned in the comment by Armand 
D' Amato, the brother of Senator Alfonse D' Amato, after his mail-fraud convic-
tion was overturned by the Second Circuit. D' Amato called himself the victim of 
"a baseless prosecution comparable to the ones Rudy Giuliani brought against in-
nocent people on Wall Street." Alison Mitchell, The 1994 Campaign: Mayor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at B5. 
105. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991). For example, 
Stewart writes that, as of May 1987, "Giuliani had had a remarkable string of 
highly publicized successes .... He had reaped further praise for the Boesky plea 
agreement and his crackdown on Wall Street. Giuliani was on a roll, one that 
could easily propel him into New York City's mayoral mansion, or the state 
governor's mansion." Id. at 341. 
106. See OOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 79; Lazarus, supra note 1, at 
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- the complete inaction in districts bringing no cases at all - is 
highly misleading. If one sought a structure that assured meaning-
ful, consistent, but not unrestrained criminal enforcement, it 
would look much like the one we already have. 
B. Centralization and Consistency 
The familiar arguments for DOJ control of federal litigation, in 
general, tum largely on the benefits of centralization - of having 
a single, coherent decisionmaker who understands the big picture. 
This argument rings somewhat hollow if the theoretical central-
ized decisionmaker in tum delegates decision-making authority to 
dozens of autonomous offices around the country. Yet that is ex-
actly the arrangement that prevails with regard to federal criminal 
prosecutions. In considering the structural protection offered by 
assigning litigation responsibility to particular attorneys, this 
Article considers both the relationship between DOJ and EPA 
and the relationship between Main Justice and the U.S. Attorneys 
offices. 
In the environmental crimes setting, DOJ's one voice mantra is 
focused on the importance of consistency in charging decisions. 
According to the DOJ Internal Review: 
[T]he federal environmental statutes pose special enforcement 
problems with respect to uniform application of the law. On the 
other hand, environmental laws, like other laws, should be inter-
preted and applied consistently, so that the law evolves in an or-
derly fashion and every citizen is subject to the same legal require-
ments. Thus, there is a need for some mechanism to ensure that 
these complex, technical, and frequently ambiguous statutes and 
regulations are interpreted consistently across the Nation. But on 
the other hand, the decision whether to prosecute a particular 
violation always involves an element of discretion, and the deci-
sion whether to prosecute an environmental violation may properly 
turn on regional or local concerns that reflect the affected 
community's priorities and needs.' 07 
Because the sanction is so severe and the stakes are so high, 
the norm of treating like cases alike is especially compelling 
2496-2507. 
107. DOJ INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 79, at 47. 
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here. The same impulse that lies behind the creation of the sen-
tencing guidelines, which were supposed to eliminate disparities 
in the sentencing of similar defendants who had committed simi-
lar crimes, of course applies to the criminal enforcement regime 
generally. 
It is simply not tenable to deny that fairness and consistency 
are enhanced by centralization. This is plainly an argument for 
placing authority in Main Justice rather than the U.S. Attorneys 
offices. It is also an argument for placing authority in DOJ rather 
than EPA, although the matter is more complicated. The usual 
claim, that overall governmental consistency is served by central-
izing litigation in DOJ, ought to apply here because EPA might 
overemphasize environmental prosecutions at the expense of other 
criminal enforcement priorities. One caveat is in order, however. 
Because DOJ has a separate environmental division, and an envi-
ronmental crimes section within that division, there is some of 
the same risk of tunnel vision that would exist if criminal prose-
cution were left to EPA. This concern returns us to the relation-
ship between Main Justice and the USAOs, as the latter may have 
the advantage of non-specialization over ECS. 
C. Alternatives to Criminal Enforcement 
It is not only important that EPA cannot bring judicial enforce-
ment actions; it is also important that it can bring administrative 
enforcement actions without DOJ. Although highly visible and 
much discussed, criminal prosecutions remain a tiny part of over-
all environmental enforcement. The real environmental enforce-
ment program takes place outside of the courts altogether; EPA's 
administrative enforcement efforts dwarf both civil and criminal 
actions. For FY 1994, the respective numbers were: 
Administrative enforcements (total): 3,600 
Administrative penalty actions: 1,596 
Civil Referrals to DOJ: 403 
Criminal Referrals to DOJ: 220108 
108. 1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-2, 4-4, 4-8. Possible 
monetary penalties are comparable in all three regimes. Under the Clean Air Act, 
for example, civil judicial penalties and administrative penalties both have a 
maximum of $25,000 per day per violation, although the latter cannot exceed a 
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Reliance on administrative sanctions has increased steadily over 
the years, in part because Congress has several times amended 
the relevant statutes to increase EPA' s administrative enforcement 
authority. For example, the 1972 Clean Water Act authorized 
administrative penalties only for oil spills and violations of ma-
rine sanitation device requirements. 100 Extensive amendments in 
1987 authorized EPA to assess administrative penalties for virtu-
ally any violation of the Act. 110 Similarly, the 1970 Clean Air 
Act provided for administrative penalties in Section 120,111 but 
the formula for actually calculating the penalties was so unwieldy 
and complex that this authority was little utilized. 112 As part of 
the 1990 Amendments, Congress greatly enlarged the agency's 
administrative enforcement authority, broadening the types of 
violations subject to administrative compliance orders, giving 
EPA authority to issue administrative penalty orders, and adding 
a field citation program. 113 
Faced with a range of enforcement options, EPA will almost 
always proceed administratively. As one regional attorney stated: 
total of $200,000. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(b)-(c), CAA §§ 113(b)-(c) (1994). In prac-
tice penalties actually imposed are, not surprisingly, smallest in administrative 
cases and largest in criminal cases, reflecting the fact that EPA turns to these dif-
ferent mechanisms according to the seriousness of the underlying violation. Thus 
for FY 1994 the 250 criminal defendants were assessed $36.8 million in fines 
and 99 years in prison; the 166 civil defendants were assessed almost $65.7 mil-
lion in penalties; and the 1596 administrative penalty orders totalled $48 million. 
1994 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-3, 4-5. 
109. Hodas, supra note 41, at 1583 n.158. 
110. See Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 46 (codified as Clean Water Act 
§ 309(g), 33 u.s.c. § 1319(g) (1994)). 
111. 42 U.S.C. § 7420, CAA§ 120 (1994). 
112. See James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and Criminal Enforcement 
of the Clean Air Act After the 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 
308-10 (1992). 
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d), CAA § 113(d) (1994). See generally Miskiewicz & 
Rudd, supra note 112, at 308-16. EPA' s other statutes also provide for broad 
administrative enforcement authority. Indeed, TSCA and Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") provide only for administrative penal-
ties; while such penalties are subject to judicial review and judicial enforcement, 
neither Act provides for judicially imposed fines. 7 U.S.C. § 136l(a), FIFRA 
§ 14(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a), TSCA § 16(a) (1994). 
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"If I have a choice I will always go the administrative route 
except with the truly recalcitrant, hard-core, repeat violator."114 
There are many reasons for EPA' s preference for administrative 
enforcement, including its relative informality and speed. But one 
significant part of the explanation is that the agency handles 
administrative cases entirely on its own. EPA thus avoids the 
headaches of working with (or for) DOJ, while ensuring that it 
receives full credit. 115 
Rightly or wrongly, some cases are handled administratively 
instead of ending up in the courts because of the division of 
lawyering tasks. Some commentators have objected that this 
undermines enforcement. 116 However, if one is worried about 
114. Interview with Walter Mugdan, Acting Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA, 
Region II, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 4, 1994). 
115. A criminal prosecution can be a frustrating and demoralizing experience 
for the agency attorney. 
The agency attorneys assigned to the local federal prosecutor are 
usually treated as "second class" assistants. . . . [T]he agency attor-
neys feel that they are asked to act as "clerks" for the local prosecu-
tor. There is a reluctance among many agency attorneys to work with 
a local federal prosecutor. There is not "status," no enjoyment in 
prosecuting a case, and certainly no "glory." When the matter is final-
ly prosecuted, if it succeeds, the U.S. Attorney receives the glory and 
credit. If it fails, the agency often gets the blame. 
August Bequai, White-Collar Plea Bargaining, TRIAL, July 1977, at 38, 41. 
116. Peter Yeager ascribes inadequate Clean Water Act enforcement in part to 
the regulatory competition between EPA and OOJ, stating that "the agency re-
frains from referring some prosecutable cases because the EPA does not wish to 
share credit for the case with the department." Peter Cleary Yeager, Industrial 
Water Pollution, in BEYOND THE LAW: CRIME IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 97, 
139 (Michael Tonry & Albert J. Reiss, Jr. eds., 1993) (vol. 18 of CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF REsEARCH). By "get[ting] sole enforcement credit" in this 
way, the agency will "have a stronger regulatory record to show its superiors and 
congressional oversight committees when annual budgets are requested." Id. 
Yeager quotes the Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles as somewhat 
petulantly complaining about this phenomenon: 
In fact, many cases by the noncriminal investigative agencies -by 
that I mean the regulatory agencies - never get presented to the U.S. 
Attorney's Office. A very significant reason why they don't ... is 
because the agency gets no credit for a criminal prosecution. The 
agency gets credit for civil action ... that it can file and that its law-
yers can handle, but the agency gets no statistical credit at budget 
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overprosecution, the availability and, from EPA's perspective, 
greater attractiveness of the administrative alternative is an impor-
tant safety valve that would be undercut, though not eliminated, 
were EPA to handle both types of enforcement itself. 
D. Expertise 
The final standard argument for DOJ litigating authority is that 
the agency's substantive expertise is outweighed by the 
department's litigation expertise. In the environmentaf crimes 
setting, Main Justice tries to have it both ways on this score. On 
the one hand, vis-a-vis EPA, DOJ's stance is that DOJ lawyers 
are experienced prosecutors whereas EPA lawyers have never 
seen the inside of a courtroom. But, vis-a-vis the USAOs, DOJ 
stands this argument on its head. The claim is now that Main 
Justice (in the form of the Environmental Crimes Section) must 
be involved in prosecutions because it does have specialized 
expertise in environmental law, whereas lawyers in the USAOs 
are generalists insufficiently familiar with those arcane complexi-
ties.117 
time for a criminal case that has been prosecuted. 
The best example is that for the last three years the United 
States Attorney in Los Angeles ... has been trying to get the United 
States government more actively involved in environmental prosecu-
tions. . . . But when the EPA takes a look at a case, very often we 
never even hear about it. They handle it either administratively or 
civilly and they will not bring the U.S. Attorney's Office into it for 
criminal prosecution. 
Id. at 139-40 (quoting Richard E. Drooyan). Drooyan's remarks are slightly 
dated but not inapplicable to the present day. 
117. I will stay out of the expertise battle between Main Justice and the 
USAOs, other than to make three short points. First, some members of the de-
fense bar have objected that AUSAs do lack adequate familiarity with the fine 
points of environmental law. Theodore Garret writes: 
[T]he [AUSAs] in the field often lack the RCRA expertise of their 
colleagues at DOJ headquarters. The combined result may be that the 
lead prosecutor in a particular case has an incomplete understanding 
of how EPA has interpreted the relevant RCRA regulations, or a lack 
of perspective on the significance of the alleged violations, or both. 
RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 102, at 225. 
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Whether DOJ or EPA has the relatively stronger position in the 
expertise debate depends on the type of case. In a petition for 
review of an agency regulation, the agency lawyer's familiarity 
with the details and history of the statute, regulation, and overall 
regulatory scheme are an important advantage, not much out-
weighed by less litigation experience. In the criminal setting, 
however, the situation is just the opposite. There are separate liti-
gation skills, wholly independent of the particular substantive law 
violated, in criminal prosecutions - more so than in any other 
area of litigation. As many have noted, environmental attorneys 
learned this the hard way in the early 1980s.118 Technical envi-
ronmental expertise is much less important. Indeed, if one really 
needs the highly specialized understanding of the statutes found 
only in EPA and not in the Environment Division or the USAO 
to prosecute a case effectively, it is a case that should not have 
been brought as a criminal prosecution in the first place. Even if 
one thinks, as the author does, that the chorus of complaints 
about inappropriate criminal prosecutions for "technical" viola-
tions is overstated, it does not sit well to insist that an effective 
criminal prosecution requires the extraordinary specialized exper-
tise of an EPA attorney because it is beyond the ken of other 
government lawyers (and so also, presumably, generalist judges 
and lay juries). 
Lastly, DOJ claims a sort of expertise arising from its neutrali-
ty and objectivity. As a general proposition this is a valid but 
limited point, much diluted by the existence of a separate Envi-
ronment Division. It has some force, however, in the environmen-
Second, environmental law is extraordinarily technical and complex. See 
generally Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2428-38. 
Third, it is impossible to generalize about this concern, because the level 
of familiarity with environmental law minutia varies hugely from one USAO to 
another. 
118. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460-61; Starr, supra note 7, at 907. 
The usual example of an EPA attorney in over his head is United States v. Gold, 
470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that the EPA lawyer's appearance 
before the grand jury as both attorney and witness resulted in the dismissal of the 
indictment). See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2460-61 n.240; DOJ INTERNAL RE-
VIEW, supra note 79, at 57 & n.62, 152-58 [between nn. 186 & 197); Starr, supra 
note 7, at 906. 
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tal crimes setting. Environmental enforcement is multi-tiered; it 
never begins (and should never begin) with a criminal prosecu-
tion. A matter usually only reaches the prosecution stage when 
the defendant is a repeat violator, or particularly recalcitrant, and 
administrative efforts to achieve compliance have failed. 119 By 
this stage, EPA and the defendant know each other. The dispute 
can easily become personal. An inappropriate prosecution would 
be particularly likely to occur when the prosecutor is angry at the 
defendant and has a personal stake in the prosecution. Therefore, 
turning to a new attorney outside EPA is an important protection. 
E. Increasing EPA' s Role to Protect Defendants 
Two possible reforms could bolster the protections provided by 
enforcement structures against overzealous environmental pros-
ecutions. Both involve a greater role for EPA, but without giving 
it the power to bring environmental prosecutions. 
First, as discussed earlier, the fact that EPA handles administra-
tive enforcement without DOJ is one factor keeping cases out of 
the courts. Taking this principle a step further, one might give 
EPA exclusive authority to handle civil judicial enforcement, 
thereby creating an automatic EPA preference for civil over crim-
inal enforcement and keeping borderline cases on the civil side. 
While this change would probably have the intended effect, it 
would be a mistake. First, it would be incomplete, as DOJ does 
not depend on EPA for all its criminal referrals and DOJ could 
generate criminal cases on its own even if EPA referred none at 
all. Second, the question of whether EPA should have indepen-
dent litigating authority is an enormously complex one. Its answer 
cannot depend on what the indirect consequences would be for 
criminal prosecutions; that would be the tail wagging the dog. 
The second possible reform, which does make sense, is to 
require DOJ to present all proposed criminal prosecutions to EPA 
for approval or, at the very least for comment. The overall impact 
of this change would be slight - most criminal prosecutions 
begin as EPA referrals anyhow, and EPA will rarely be opposed 
to the prosecution of those that do not have such origins. None-
119. See Starr, supra note 7, at 904. 
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theless, the agency would catch the occasional error. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Sel/20 the court reversed criminal con-
victions on four RCRA counts on the ground that the natural gas 
condensate that had been disposed in violation of RCRA require-
ments was not in fact a hazardous waste. 121 This conclusion 
turned on a careful reading of lengthy EPA discussions in the 
preambles to several different rulemakings. 122 Because in this 
area the legal prohibition often turns on consideration of, and 
familiarity with, the details not just of a particular statute but of 
EPA regulations, EPA input into the appropriateness or validity 
of a criminal prosecution should always be obtained. 123 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the increase in criminal environmental prosecutions 
over the past decade, there have been remarkably few abuses. 
Those concerned about overzealous, blindered prosecutors can 
point to only a handful of cases where things got out of hand. 
The potential for abuse exists, but it has gone largely unrealized. 
Why has this been? 
The answer lies in structural protections - those of the crimi-
nal law generally and those provided by taking criminal enforce-
ment out of the hands of the usual environmental enforcers. With 
one minor modification, requiring DOJ to obtain EPA approval 
for criminal prosecution, the current regime is essentially sound. 
120. 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 1077-82. 
123. I thank Neal Cartusciello and Gary Norkin (EPA Region II) for suggesting 
Self as an example of a failed prosecution that could have been avoided if DOJ 
was required to obtain EPA approval. I note that they both endorsed the idea. 
Richard Lazarus also discusses Self, he offers it as an example of how 
obscure environmental law is. See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 2437-38. Lazarus 
believes that environmental law's obscurity is one of the features that make crim-
inal prosecutions potentially so problematic: "[t]his obscurity stems from the 
sheer density of environmental rules and their obscure, often inaccessible source 
materials." Id. at 2436. I agree with his observations and add two points. We 
generally tend not to rely upon the EPA to interpret the law, thinking ourselves 
capable of cutting through environmental law's obscurity. To remedy this prob-
lem, the DOJ should be required to rely upon the EPA's interpretation of the law 
so as to ensure proper application of the law to a particular case. 
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DOJ should be the prosecutor, and Main Justice should oversee 
the USAOs. This is not because DOJ should necessarily handle 
all environmental litigation. To the contrary, there is room for a 
fuller role for EPA attorneys in other settings. It is precisely 
because a criminal prosecution is different that the checks and 
balances and the consistency provided by multi-party and ulti-
mately centralized decision-making are especially valuable here. 
